Trial Graphics Pipeline Failure Analysis Olympic Pipeline TMBA
"Pipeline Catastrophe"
Extreme Evidence
Court TV
3D Animations: TMBA, Inc.
On June 10, 1999, at about 3:30 p.m. Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), a 16-inch diameter pipeline owned by Olympic Pipe Line Company ruptured, and gasoline leaked into the Hanna and Whatcom Creeks in Whatcom Falls Park within the City of Bellingham, Washington.
About 5:02 p.m., the gasoline ignited, resulting in a fireball that traveled approximately 1 1/2 miles downstream from the pipeline failure location.
Two 10-year-old boys and an 18-year-old young man lost their lives as a result of this tragic accident. Eight additional injuries were documented, along with significant property damage to a single-family residence and the City of Bellingham's water treatment plant.
The release of approximately ¼ million gallons of gasoline caused substantial environmental damage to the waterways.
Shortly after being notified of the accident, the National Transportation Safety Board launched a team of investigators to the scene. Safety Board personnel were on scene for approximately 5 weeks.
Possible accident causes
Several events and conditions could have set the stage for the pipeline rupture.
The first was external damage, gouges, and dents to the pipeline in the vicinity of the eventual rupture. Second was the construction and startup of the Bayview products terminal. During construction of the terminal, pressure relief valves were installed that were later found to be improperly configured or adjusted, and the actions taken by the company to test and correct the valve settings now seem to have been ineffective.
Finally, on the day of the accident, the SCADA system that controllers used to operate the pipeline became unresponsive, making it difficult for controllers to analyze pipeline conditions and make timely responses to operational problems.
After the Bayview products terminal became operational in December 1998, controllers began to experience difficulties that often involved pressure increases within Bayview, causing the inlet block valve upstream of Bayview to close, thus shutting down the pipeline. Between December 1998 and June 1999, when the accident occurred, the inlet block valve closed 41 times because of high pressure at Bayview.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded if the SCADA system computers had remained responsive to the commands of the Olympic controllers, the controller operating the pipeline probably would have been able to initiate actions that would have prevented the pressure increase that ruptured the pipeline.
In other words, the unresponsiveness of the SCADA system was determined to be the proximate cause of the rupture.
Extreme Evidence
Court TV
3D Animations: TMBA, Inc.
On June 10, 1999, at about 3:30 p.m. Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), a 16-inch diameter pipeline owned by Olympic Pipe Line Company ruptured, and gasoline leaked into the Hanna and Whatcom Creeks in Whatcom Falls Park within the City of Bellingham, Washington.
About 5:02 p.m., the gasoline ignited, resulting in a fireball that traveled approximately 1 1/2 miles downstream from the pipeline failure location.
Two 10-year-old boys and an 18-year-old young man lost their lives as a result of this tragic accident. Eight additional injuries were documented, along with significant property damage to a single-family residence and the City of Bellingham's water treatment plant.
The release of approximately ¼ million gallons of gasoline caused substantial environmental damage to the waterways.
Shortly after being notified of the accident, the National Transportation Safety Board launched a team of investigators to the scene. Safety Board personnel were on scene for approximately 5 weeks.
Possible accident causes
Several events and conditions could have set the stage for the pipeline rupture.
The first was external damage, gouges, and dents to the pipeline in the vicinity of the eventual rupture. Second was the construction and startup of the Bayview products terminal. During construction of the terminal, pressure relief valves were installed that were later found to be improperly configured or adjusted, and the actions taken by the company to test and correct the valve settings now seem to have been ineffective.
Finally, on the day of the accident, the SCADA system that controllers used to operate the pipeline became unresponsive, making it difficult for controllers to analyze pipeline conditions and make timely responses to operational problems.
After the Bayview products terminal became operational in December 1998, controllers began to experience difficulties that often involved pressure increases within Bayview, causing the inlet block valve upstream of Bayview to close, thus shutting down the pipeline. Between December 1998 and June 1999, when the accident occurred, the inlet block valve closed 41 times because of high pressure at Bayview.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded if the SCADA system computers had remained responsive to the commands of the Olympic controllers, the controller operating the pipeline probably would have been able to initiate actions that would have prevented the pressure increase that ruptured the pipeline.
In other words, the unresponsiveness of the SCADA system was determined to be the proximate cause of the rupture.