“There is simply no escape,” a quote used by the New York Court of Appeals in its July 1st decision that found an Albany County law unconstitutional. A 15-year-old high school student, Marquan M., operated a Facebook page where he anonymously posted pictures of his classmates accompanied by descriptions of their sexual activity, including sexual partners and other personal information. The court noted that the posts were “vulgar and offensive.” As a result, Marquan M.
received responses that threatened physical harm. Following a police investigation, Marquan M. was identified as the creator of the posts and admitted his involvement.
Marquan M. pleaded guilty to cyberbullying, a misdemeanor offense in Albany County. However, the Court of Appeals found the law Marquan M. violated unconstitutional and struck down his indictment. The appeal, in People v. Marquan M. (No. 139, 2014 NY Slip Op 04881), centered around Marquan M.’s argument that Albany County’s law criminalizing cyberbullying was overbroad and vague, in violation of the First Amendment. Marquan M. did not appeal his conviction and had pleaded guilty to the cyberbullying offense, but because the law was so broadly worded, his conviction was reversed.
The statute in question, referred to as the Dignity for All Students Act, set out to “afford all students in public schools an environment free of discrimination and harassment [caused by] bullying, taunting or intimidation.” However, since the Act’s language did not criminalize such behavior or directly encompass non-physical bullying, or cyberbullying, the Albany County Legislature adopted a new crime that outlawed cyberbullying directed at “any minor or person” situation in Albany County.
Accordingly, unlawful cyberbullying activity may be subject to up to one year in jail and a $1,000 fine.
Upon review, the Marquan M. court read the law’s language in its broadest senses, finding that it made it a criminal offense to “communicat[e] . . . by mechanical or electronic means . . . with no legitimate . . . personal . . . purpose, with the intent to harass [or] annoy . . . another person.” On appeal, Marquan M. argued that the law was both overbroad and vague, since it does not provide proper notice to the public of the proscribed unlawful conduct. The County argued that due to the law’s severability provision, only the unconstitutional portion of the law should be struck down. While the court agreed that the government has a “compelling interest in protecting children from harmful publications or materials," it disagreed with the County’s argument. Specifically, the court found the law’s language so broad that it could conceivably include “for example: an email disclosing private information about a corporation or a telephone conversation meant to annoy an adult” and struck it down, thereby reversing Marquan M.’s indictment.
The court’s decision is significant because it illustrates both the legislature’s and the court’s struggle to find adequate grounds to punish cyberbullies while respecting the basic constitutional right of free speech. The court said that the First Amendment may allow for the enactment of laws criminalizing cyberbullying directed at children, and the decision warns that the language of such laws must be narrowly tailored enough to avoid reading its language to criminalize communications outside the context of cyberbullying children. Yet cyberbullying activity is, itself, broad—it comes in all forms of communications, from all different individuals, directed at all types of people, meant to “bully” for a variety of reasons. However, the decision provides guidance on drafting cyberbullying laws, allowing more legislatures to draft such laws in the future that pass constitutional muster and combat cyberbullying.